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I. INTRODUCTION
The efficacy of tort law in the United States has been widely criti-
cized by academics and judges.1  In the mass tort context, a great deal
of criticism has focused on the inefficiencies created by individual
claim autonomy—the notion that every person is entitled to his or her
own day in court.  Attempts to individually adjudicate mass tort cases,
such as asbestos and other mass-exposure cases, have clogged court
dockets and substantially burdened the civil justice system.2  Some
scholars argue that the process of individually litigating mass tort
claims and allowance of opt-out rights in class actions lead to subop-
timal investment by plaintiffs.3  Further, the concentrated interests of
mass tort defendants—who may expect numerous similar suits—en-
dow them with an “asymmetric scale advantage” to invest in litiga-
tion.4  On the other hand, defendants are forced to re-litigate issues
across multiple jurisdictions, risking inconsistent judgments, facing
prolonged uncertainty, and incurring ever-growing legal expenses.
Similar and overlapping issues, such as design defect and failure to
warn, have motivated courts to attempt aggregation of mass tort cases
into class actions.5  Yet these attempts have been frustrated by the
strong presumption in American jurisprudence that every individual
has a right to a day in court.6
1. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 1–34 (1970); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 169–71 (7th ed. 2007); Richard A. Epstein,
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Robert Rabin, Law for
Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2279–83 (1996) (reviewing ERNEST WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851
(1984); [hereinafter Rosenberg, Causal Connection].
2. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1721, 1725 (2002).
3. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847–49 (2002); McGovern, supra note 2,
at 1741–44.
4. David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 28–29; see Rosenberg, supra note 3, at R
852–53; McGovern, supra note 2, at 1741–44. R
5. See, e.g., Michael Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an
Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 93–94
(1997).
6. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (referring to “our deep-
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” (quoting
Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)));
McGovern, supra note 2, at 1745 (noting that “there has been no further judicial R
effort to coerce future asbestos plaintiffs into a predefined payment mode” since
the Supreme Court rejected the settlement in Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997) and the Court’s decision in Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815 (finding a pro-
posed mandatory settlement class improperly certified under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23)).
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In the face of academic criticism and judicial pleas for help, others
support individual claim autonomy as a means to preserve the notion
of corrective justice.7  Rather than focus on the efficacy of tort law at
serving societal functions, corrective justice proponents often argue
tort law is inherently self-justifying, which, of course, begs the ques-
tion: “Why does tort law exist?”8  In addressing that question, this Ar-
ticle examines the political philosophy of John Locke and argues that
legal formalism is necessary for restraining government and instilling
the rule of law but that the particular form of law adopted by a juris-
diction should reflect society’s substantive policy goals.  The law’s
form should reflect its function.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of America’s mass tort
debate.  Part III proceeds to defend rule-of-law formalism in so far as
it serves society’s needs but rejects arguments for retaining certain
legal formalities merely for tradition’s sake.  Part IV discuses the po-
litical philosophy of John Locke and reveals Lockean political philoso-
phy’s implications for the relationship between form and function in
the law in general and the mass tort problem in particular.
II. THE MASS TORT PROBLEM
The common law tort system provides a civilized means for an in-
jured party to address a grievance against an alleged tortfeasor and
seek compensation for harm.9  This system has been said to have
many (at times overlapping and inconsistent) functions, including cor-
rective justice, optimal deterrence, loss distribution, compensation,
and redress of social grievances.10  The American tort system was de-
veloped in Great Britain prior to the Industrial Revolution, was ex-
ported to the United States, and has evolved under the watch of
judges practicing the common law tradition.
Despite its developments, the modern tort system is largely a ves-
tige of a simpler time.  The tort system is an expensive and inefficient
method for achieving any of its purported goals.  A 1986 study esti-
mated that plaintiffs typically turn over one-third of their damage
7. See, e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 69 (1989).
8. See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1–5 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of
private law is to be private law.”).
9. For a discussion of the theoretical and practical reasons a society may choose to
prohibit certain externality-causing activities and allow–but mandate compensa-
tion for–other externality-causing activities (admittedly almost any activity pro-
duces some level of externality), particularly distinguishing between activities
that create value and non-value-creating wealth transfers, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 54–87 (1974).
10. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORM AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW: AN ANALYTI-
CAL PRIMER ON CASES AND CONCEPTS 14–20 (2d ed. 2002).
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awards for attorney fees and litigation expenses.11  Additionally, de-
fendants’ legal fees equaled approximately fifteen percent of damages
awarded in tort suits.12
In the late Nineteenth Century, the Industrial Revolution gave rise
to a new problem for tort law to address: mechanized accidents.13  The
economic and social implications of industrial accidents called into
question the efficacy of tort law in an industrialized world.14  The tort
system’s failure to adequately address industrial injuries caused legis-
latures to devise workers’ compensation programs deemed to better
meet society’s needs.15
Mass torts are again calling into question the tort system’s ability
to combat vast economic and social problems.  As Professor John
Goldberg surmises, “[W]e have asked too much of [tort law]. . . . [It] is
not well-suited to solve the large-scale social and political problems it
is being asked to solve (if only by default).”16
A. The Mandatory Class Action Approach to Mass Tort
The traditional tort law system is ill-equipped to handle cases re-
lated to mass-produced products.17  Over twenty-five years ago, Pro-
fessor David Rosenberg noted that mass exposure cases were arising
with increasing frequency due to mass production.18  The damages al-
legedly caused by any one mass-produced product and the costs associ-
ated with litigating claims related to such a product can reach
hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars.19  Individual mass tort
adjudication is particularly problematic because proof of complex sci-
entific and medical claims requires significant investment by plain-
tiffs whose fractional interests in their anticipated judgments create
little incentive to litigate compared to the highly-concentrated incen-
tive of mass tort defendants.20  These costs can become prohibitively
11. Rabin, supra note 1, at 2280 (citing JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, R
COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 68–74 (1986)).
12. Id.
13. John Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1501, 1506 (2002).
14. Id. at 1507.
15. Id. at 1506–07.
16. Id. at 1518.
17. Although the author agrees that the American tort system is in need of reform,
he does not necessarily agree with all of the views expressed in this section.
Rather, this section serves to summarize the views of scholars favoring a move to
a mandatory class action system.
18. See Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 1, at 851–54. R
19. See id.; see also David Rosenberg, The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years:
The Path Not Taken, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1044, 1046 (1997) [hereinafter Rosen-
berg, The Path Not Taken] (noting the multi-billion dollar settlement in the sili-
cone breast implant “spectacle”).
20. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
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expensive to the individual plaintiff due to the complexity of medical
evidence and expert witness testimony: “The system’s case-by-case
mode of adjudication makes mass exposure litigation needlessly ex-
pensive by requiring separate and repeated determinations of various
complex issues, such as those regarding causation, that are common to
all the claims arising out of any single mass exposure event.”21  The
Rand Corporation estimated that sixty-one percent of money trans-
ferred in asbestos cases is attributable to the transaction costs of liti-
gation.22  Class actions allow plaintiffs to share the costs of proving
such claims, thus making litigation more efficient.  Further, forcing
plaintiffs to consolidate claims reduces the litigation expenses in-
curred by defendants, eliminates redundancies in litigation, avoids
the risk of inconsistent judgments, and prevents plaintiffs from strate-
gically gaming the system against defendants.
In addition to the crippling costs of individual litigation, the tradi-
tional tort system is ill-suited to mass tort cases involving complex
scientific questions.  Commenting on how the legal profession and
academy has lived up to the ideas expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., in The Path of the Law,23 Professor Rosenberg noted:
To be sure, tort liability plays a useful role in cases in which the courts essen-
tially enforce generally accepted scientific opinion, as they do in the asbestos
context.  But the spectacle of silicone breast implant plaintiffs asserting
claims that were scientifically dubious but that nevertheless resulted in a
multi-billion dollar settlement (while bankrupting a major pharmaceutical
company) raises questions about the wisdom of allowing tort law to venture
into areas of scientific debate and impose its traditional all-or-nothing judg-
ments regardless of the degree of scientific uncertainty.24
A particular problem arises concerning the specific causation re-
quirement.25  One paradigm of mass tort cases involves product liabil-
ity claims against firms that produced fungible pharmaceutical agents
or products containing asbestos or silica.26  When several firms intro-
duce fungible products into the market that cause diseases with long
latency periods, proof of which firm supplied the particular product
that caused any individual plaintiff’s particular harm is often a near-
impossible hurdle that can frustrate the tort system’s goal of optimal
deterrence.  The background risks typical of some diseases further
21. Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 1, at 900 (internal citations omitted); R
see also Rabin, supra note 1, at 2281 (questioning the institutional capacity of R
courts to make factual findings on complicated scientific and technological mat-
ters); Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, supra note 19, at 1046 (questioning the R
institutional capacity of courts to make factual findings on complicated scientific
and technological matters).
22. See Perino, supra note 5, at 94–95, 94 n.21. R
23. 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
24. Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, supra note 19, at 1046. R
25. See generally Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 1. R
26. See id. at 853.
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complicate matters of proof and can lead to defendants being held lia-
ble for harms they did not cause.27  In such cases, an alternative dam-
ages or liability award system, such as proportional liability or
liability based on a market-share or a “contribution risk” basis may
provide a more efficient means to achieve optimal deterrence while
protecting defendants from exposure to liability based on uncertain
science.28
Reform proponents argue the continued failure of the American le-
gal system to utilize mandatory class actions (or some alternative ad-
judication mechanism) frustrates optimal deterrence and victim
compensation because individual plaintiffs lack the incentives to ade-
quately invest in separate litigation.29  Professor Rosenberg advocates
decoupling the determination of damage liability (the quantified harm
caused by the mass tort defendant) from the distribution of damage
awards (the amount paid to individual mass tort claimants).30
Decoupling would serve the deterrence and compensation functions
better than the current system, which conflates the two functions into
a damage liability award that provides compensation.31  Decoupling
would (1) exploit economies of scale through aggregate, mandatory
class actions; (2) serve the deterrence function through a trial stage
that assesses the aggregate tortious harm caused by the defective
product; and (3) serve the victim compensation function by establish-
ing an insurance fund from the damage assessment, from which vic-
tims would be compensated according to severity of loss, as opposed to
strength of legal claim.32
A major hurdle to a mandatory class action rule is the notion of
individual claim autonomy, often manifested by plaintiff opt-out
rights.  Proponents argue that mandatory class actions are needed to
overcome the collective action problems that cause individuals with
27. See generally Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, supra note 19, at 1047 (noting that
some view judgments based on scientifically-erroneous findings favorably “as a
means of transferring wealth from well-heeled defendant corporations to needy
and helpless individual plaintiffs”).
28. See Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 1, at 855–57; see also Sindell v. R
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (adopting market share liability in DES
class actions).  It is important to note that not all products causing complications
are defective, nor should manufacturers of non-defective products be required to
pay compensation.  Further, class actions are not appropriate for all alleged mass
torts, particularly when the nature and form of injuries varies greatly or plaintiff-
specific factors dominate.
29. See David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in
Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2002) [here-
inafter Rosenberg, Decoupling].
30. See id. at 1871–77.
31. See id. at 1883–88.
32. See id. at 1876.
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strong legal claims to opt out of class actions.33  Under the current
system, rational individuals with strong claims will opt out of the
class, undermining economically efficient resolution of the mass
tort.34  Although prohibiting opt-out rights sounds offensive to the
traditional notion of individual justice, legal rules are, and should be,
designed ex ante to promote the best substantive outcomes under a
rule of law.  Because people do not know whether they will be tort
victims or what the strength of their potential claims will be ex ante,
rational actors will prefer a system that achieves the greatest total
social welfare—one providing all individuals the best prospective out-
come ex ante.
It is inherently cheaper to avoid an unreasonable risk—which by
definition costs more than it benefits society—than to compensate an
accident victim for damages arising from an unreasonable risk.35
Therefore, a system that achieves optimal deterrence is in society’s
best interest.  If mandatory class actions move our tort system toward
more effective deterrence, forfeiting opt-out rights is a form of
favorable mast-tying for all rational individuals.  By contrast, the in-
dividual justice, “day in court” rationale supposes that individuals
would rather bear greater risk in a system with suboptimal insurance
in exchange for the ability to litigate their claims independently.36
Professor Michael Perino argues that in promoting the concept of
individual autonomy, opt-out rights “frustrate the resolution of com-
plex claims,” thus undermining individual welfare and “not serv[ing]
their intended purpose.”37  Perino contends opt-out rights often
destabilize classes and facilitate collective action problems,  do not al-
ways provide an adequate check against sweetheart deals, and moti-
vate rent seeking by class members with strong legal claims.38
Because the intended benefits of opt-out rights are largely illusory,
33. Perino, supra note 5, at 85; see also David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (ar-
guing that class actions better serve individual justice than individual
adjudication).
34. For example, an individual with a sympathetic background or a strong case may
opt out to pursue her chances of winning a blockbuster award.  Meanwhile, indi-
viduals with less sympathetic backgrounds or weak cases (but who have still suf-
fered damages) will be part of a weaker class without the benefit of the
individuals with strong cases.
35. For the modern American tort law definition of reasonableness, see Judge
Learned Hand’s use of cost-benefit analysis to determine the confines of the duty
of reasonableness.  United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (“Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in alge-
braic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liabil-
ity depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”).
36. See Rosenberg, Decoupling, supra note 29, at 1891, 1908–09, 1913, 1915. R
37. Perino, supra note 5, at 85; see also Rosenberg, supra, note 33 (arguing that class
actions better serve individual justice than individual adjudication).
38. Perino, supra note 5, at 115–37.
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Perino suggests opt-out rights should be severely limited or com-
pletely eliminated to overcome the collective action problem faced by
mass tort plaintiffs and to allow successful aggregation of collective
interests into an effective litigation class.39
B. The Individual Autonomy Concern
1. The “My Day in Court” Mentality
Despite the apparent efficiency gains of mandatory class action liti-
gation, many people remain steadfastly opposed to compelled mass ad-
judication because of the notion that everyone deserves their day in
court.  Importantly, the Supreme Court suggested, in dicta, that there
is a Fifth Amendment (and supposedly Fourteenth Amendment) due
process concern stemming from the “principle of general application in
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process,” which
serves “our deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have
his own day in court.”40  Although the Court was not passing a norma-
tive judgment on the desirability of mandatory class actions, the due
process hurdle cannot be overcome simply as a matter of conve-
nience.41  Constitutional rights cannot be brushed aside merely be-
cause they are out of favor.
While the Supreme Court has yet to definitively rule on the due
process implications of mandatory class actions, there is reason to be-
lieve that, short of a constitutional amendment, a mandatory class ac-
tion rule would be consistent with due process so long as parties’
interests were sufficiently represented.  Legislatures’ responses to the
Industrial Revolution’s effects on the safety of workers caused similar
39. Id. at 153–54.  The intended benefits of opt-out rights include preventing class
counsel from “selling out” the class for a large attorney fee, protecting high-stakes
claimants from low-stakes claimants who water down the average recovery, and
preserving traditional notions of individual justice. Id. at 105–07.
40. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting Martin v. Wilkes, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1989)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
41. Consider the Line Item Veto Act, which was a popular law intended to cut waste-
ful federal spending.  The Supreme Court found this convenience inconsistent
with the procedures laid out in the Presentment Clause. See Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding Line Item Veto Act’s cancellation provi-
sions violate the procedural mechanisms required by the Constitution’s Present-
ment Clause, art. I, § 7, cl. 2).  David Resnick, in evaluating John Locke’s
conception of constitutionalism, recognized a difference between the effectiveness
of a law at serving substantive purposes and that law’s constitutionality. See
David Resnick, Rationality and the Two Treatises, in JOHN LOCKE’S TWO TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT 82, 113 (Edward Harpham ed., 1992).  Even a substan-
tively useful law that serves constitutional goals is invalid if it is repugnant to
the Constitution. Id.
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due process concerns in the early twentieth century.42  When con-
fronted with a due process challenge to Arizona’s workers’ compensa-
tion program in 1919, the Supreme Court affirmed the legislative
replacement of the common law tort system as consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.43  In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., allowed that supplanting the
common law with a legislative compensation system that placed the
burden of compensating injured employees on employers “seems . . .
within constitutional bounds.”44
Of course, living in a republic creates many situations in which
people are bound by actions not within their direct control.  While the
legislature acts as the representative of the People, individual people
do not get their day in court to fight the deprivation of property ef-
fected through a tax increase.45  So long as the tax is passed by consti-
tutional means, it has no constitutional defect.46  Legislative acts that
assign future rights and responsibilities have generally been found
consistent with due process.47
Aside from the due process concerns of a wronged individual, a use-
ful juxtaposition to control of civil liability for rights vindication is the
criminal law.  The prosecution of criminal cases, which seek deter-
rence of future crimes and punishment for past crimes, is controlled by
the state.  The corrective justice notion of rights vindication against a
wrongdoer so strong in the civil context—indeed a victim can seek
42. See generally supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
43. See Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
44. Id. at 433 (Holmes, J., concurring).
45. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (holding
that citizen-taxpayers generally lack standing to litigate legitimate government
actions they disagree with).
46. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441,
445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is im-
practicable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption.  The Consti-
tution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly
of the whole.  General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the
person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving
them a chance to be heard.  Their rights are protected in the only way that they
can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who
make the rule.”).
47. See Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (“A judicial inquiry
investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past
facts and under laws supposed already to exist.  That is its purpose and end.
Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing condi-
tions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power.”).  For a discussion of the Due Process Clause’s effects on
legislative alteration of prospective rights, see PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELL-
HORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 238–51 (10th ed. 2003).
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civil penalties aside from the state’s criminal prosecution48—does not
exist in the criminal context.  While state control of criminal prosecu-
tion flows from the legal construction that criminal behavior is an of-
fense against the state, victims and their families routinely find
justice in punishment administered by the state.49  Yet, people readily
accept that the state will prosecute crimes, leaving no “autonomy” to
the victim.  Contrasting the civil and criminal contexts reinforces that
the substantive argument in favor of retaining individual tort claim
autonomy is not based on any assessment of the best interests of the
individual but on the ontological argument that individual claim au-
tonomy is somehow essential to the nature of private law.50
2. Law for Law’s Sake51
In 1995, Professor Ernest Weinrib laid out his defense of private
law in The Idea of Private Law.  To Professor Weinrib, liability in pri-
vate law provides a form of morality.52  Law should be seen as an in-
dependent, academic exercise focused on the value of its own process:
“[P]rivate law is a self-understanding enterprise . . . .”53  Professor
Weinrib acknowledges the obvious criticism to his assertion that “the
purpose of private law is to be private law”: His argument amounts to
nothing more than a self-justifying, “hopelessly unilluminating tautol-
ogy,” but he counters that life’s greatest fulfillments, notably love,
cannot be more meaningfully articulated than his justification of
law.54  He postulates, “Love is its own end.  My contention is that, in
this respect, private law is just like love.”55
48. See, e.g., Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (uphold-
ing O.J. Simpson’s civil liability of over $20 million in compensatory and punitive
damages for the deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman).
49. See, e.g., Walter Berns, Op-Ed., Where Are the Death Penalty Critics Today?,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2001, at A22 (“The death penalty was imposed on McVeigh
not for utilitarian reasons but because justice required it . . . .”); Laurie P. Cohen,
Doing Justice: In Terrorism Trial, Death-Penalty Debate Blazes New Ground,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2002, at A1 (assessing the impact of September 11th terror-
ist attacks on victims’ families and the families’ support of death penalty); Edito-
rial, McVeigh’s Politics, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2001, at A22 (quoting President
Bush’s description of Timothy McVeigh’s execution: “not vengeance, but justice”);
Dave Wedge, At Ground Zero, justice ‘finally done’, BOSTON HERALD (May 2,
2011), http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1335003
(noting former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s reaction to the death of
Osama bin Laden: “I feel justice has finally been done”).
50. See WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 5 (“[T]he purpose of private law is to be private R
law.”).
51. Law for Law’s Sake is the title of a book review by Robert Rabin on Ernest
Weinrib’s book, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW. See Rabin, supra note 1.
52. See WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 2. R
53. Id. at 15–16.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 6.
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True, when asked what they want out of life, people may say
“friends,” “family,” “love,” “wealth,” or “fame”; but these are desired
because they are the means to a sense of happiness or fulfillment.
Equating love to law ignores that form must serve function.  Law is a
useful means to serve desired societal functions, but a law is only as
good as its consequences.  Law itself is not happiness or fulfillment—
except perhaps for those truly devoted to esoteric pursuits.  While pos-
sessing great potential to facilitate happiness and fulfillment by serv-
ing other ends, law itself is not an end game.  The justification of any
law must be grounded in its utility.  By transforming the means into
the ends, Professor Weinrib provides a tautological defense that
serves as the falsest of analogies.56
Even the self-justifying argument of love for love’s sake is misbe-
gotten.  The feeling of love that seems self-justifying is in reality the
feeling of happiness and fulfillment that accompanies love.57  Only
when love is conceptualized as happiness or fulfillment is love its own
reward.  But, to state the obvious, law is not love; it is not a human
experience or emotion.  Law may provide a fulfilling philosophical pur-
suit for lawyers, as researching cancer may provide fulfillment to an
oncologist in this sense; but the practice or execution of law or
medicine must serve greater ends than the personal fulfillment of
those who specialize in these disciplines.  The medical community
would not be justified in continuing a practice that harmed patients
merely because it made doctors feel good.  To the extent that medicine
makes people’s lives better, it serves its purpose.  Good health serves
the human condition by allowing for fulfillment.  Private law serves
the human condition not as a direct means of fulfillment, but by pro-
viding an orderly system for resolving disputes.
56. Taken to its extreme, any horrendous entity could be justified in this manner:
Cancer is good because it is cancer; genocide is good because it is genocide.
57. The position that human fulfillment or betterment of the human condition is the
highest principle to which law and other human endeavors should aspire is one
that provides no inherent self-justification.  This is what German philosopher
Hans Kelsen termed a “grundnorm” (or, in English, a “basic norm”)—the self-
justifying principle from which other norms descend. See generally HANS KEL-
SEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS (Michael Hartney trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1991) (1979).  Grundnorms may be the will of God, the social contract, or “the
Good.” Id.; see PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. Press, 2006)
(enunciating Plato’s theory of “the Good”).  Philosopher Robert Nozick suggested
that individual autonomy and individual rights may be important because we
want people to be able to shape their lives meaningfully. See NOZICK, supra note
9, at 50.  Although he admitted he had no great answer for why a meaningful life
is worth preserving, protecting, or fostering, the concept of bettering the human
condition serves as the underlying basis for most ends-motivated law—indeed,
this is the underlying rationale for the feeling that motivates most people’s im-
pulses as to why something is right or wrong. Id.
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Responding to Professor Weinrib, Professor Robert Rabin asserts,
“Law is of an entirely different order [than love].  No one has recourse
to the law as an end in itself, rather than as a means to assert a pro-
tective claim.”58  Indeed, the tort system does not exist to provide a
form of therapy between two human beings, it is a product of the gov-
ernment designed to serve external purposes.59  To the extent civil
law provides a feeling of justice distinct from its economic benefits, the
value of that feeling can be weighed against the benefits that flow
from a system that better serves the ends of optimal deterrence and
victim compensation; however, it is doubtful that the emotional value
derived from litigation would exceed the economic value of a more effi-
cient legal system.60
Professor Weinrib favors the present form of private law because it
provides a method for linking plaintiff to defendant through a system
of correlative duties and rights, the latter of which being vindicated
through the adjudicatory process.61  Under this view, the primacy of
private law is “the direct connection between the particular plaintiff
and the particular defendant.”62  Professor Weinrib argues that ad-
herence to legal formalism supports the Aristotelian notion of correc-
tive justice, which fulfils the notion of Kantian right.63  Essentially,
law was devised to correct wrongs afflicted upon a certain notion of
rights and should remain that way.
Although this notion may have been the backdrop against which
the common law developed, critical exploration of why these rights
arose or which practical effects stemming from this notion of correc-
tive justice are important could reveal better ways to achieve these
ends.  Aristotle’s system of corrective justice focuses on direct trans-
fers from wrongdoer to injured—specifically focusing on the nature of
the relationship between the wrongful act and the harm.64  Professor
Weinrib finds Aristotle’s logic somewhat deficient but justifies his own
theory of corrective justice as serving Immanuel Kant’s notion of
equality of individual autonomy through the law’s mechanism of hold-
ing one person responsible for the impairment effects of his exercises
of autonomy on others’ autonomy.65  If Aristotle developed his system
58. Rabin, supra note 1, at 2270. R
59. See id.
60. For a discussion of economic valuation techniques for “life and other nonmone-
tary benefits,” see W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTI-
TRUST 717–43 (4th ed. 2005).  For the argument that no rational individual would
pay ex ante for the right to a day in court and forgo a system with optimal deter-
rence and compensation, see Rosenberg, Decoupling, supra note 29, at 1915–16.
61. See WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 11, 28. R
62. Id. at 10.
63. See id. at 18–21.
64. See id. at 56.
65. See id. at 57–58.
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of corrective justice based on the relationship of a wrong to an injury
and the circumstances under which a wealth transfer is appropriate to
vindicate the wrong,66 it is unclear why Professor Weinrib insists on
retaining the traditional trial system to vindicate rights.67  If Kantian
self-determinism could be furthered more efficiently through a differ-
ent set of legal mechanisms, why rigidly adhere to the current system?
The Kantian reinterpretation of the three precepts of right—“to live
honorably, to injure no one, and to give each person his due”68—are
not exclusive of a system that promotes maximization of social welfare
through optimal deterrence and victim compensation, and Professor
Weinrib provides no reason why reaching these goals through an al-
ternative mechanism is unacceptable.  If these goals can be more effec-
tively achieved through another form, the better form should
prevail.69
Despite the frailty of the legal formalism presented by Professor
Weinrib, formalism does serve an important function in fostering the
rule of law and restraining arbitrary and abusive exercises of govern-
mental power.  The next Part defends formalism in its proper context
in relation to functionalism.
III. FORM AND FUNCTION: IN DEFENSE OF A
CERTAIN TYPE OF FORMALISM
A. Rule-of-Law Formalism
A scene from Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons is frequently
used to eloquently defend what I will refer to as “rule-of-law formal-
ism.”70  In the scene, Sir Thomas More refuses to arrest Richard Rich,
who More is certain will later cause his demise.71  Although More has
the power to arrest Rich, More lacks legal authority to do so because
66. See id. at 56–57.
67. See id. at 18–21.
68. Id. at 86 (discussing “Kant’s reinterpretation of the Roman jurist Ulpian’s three
precepts of right”).
69. See id. at 18–21, 56–58 (Aristotle), 84–87 (Kant). For more thorough treatment of
Aristotle and Kant, see generally id. at 56–113. See also Rabin, supra note 1, at R
2265 (discussing Weinrib’s reliance on the Kantian notion of “self-determining
agency” and free will).  For an argument that the current tort system’s corrective
justice components do not serve the modern functional rationales for tort law (vic-
tim compensation and deterrence) because harm is not always compensated and
deterrence is merely a by-product of plaintiffs’ individual motivations, see id. at
2264.
70. See, e.g., Judge William H. Pryor Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, Keynote Address at the Federalist Society 2007 Annual Student Symposium
(Feb. 24, 2007), at 0:06:07–0:08:33, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/
publications/detail/judge-pryor-address-event-audiovideo (reading this scene
from A Man for All Seasons).
71. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 65 (Random House ed. 1962) (1960).
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Rich has done nothing illegal.72  More adheres to the law’s formal re-
quirements out of respect for the rule of law, which should restrain
individuals from bending or discarding the law for their own benefit.73
Another character, Roper, confronts More, asserting he would “cut
down every law in England to [get after the Devil],” to which More
replies:
Oh?  And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—
where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?  This country’s planted
thick with laws from coast to coast—man’s laws, not God’s—and if you cut
them down—and you’re just the man to do it—d’you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow then?  Yes, I’d give the Devil bene-
fit of law, for my own safety’s sake.74
Disregarding the law to reach the “right” result undermines the
rule of law.  Law exists to prevent the arbitrary exercise of govern-
mental power—the enforcement of any judicial decision, criminal or
civil, being an exercise of governmental power.  There is value in a
predictable system of law that allows people to know or reasonably
predict the legal consequences of their actions.  The inherent fairness
of a predictable legal system fosters social harmony by giving people
incentive to consent to governmental power, which in turn is re-
strained from arbitrary application.  To change the law or the execu-
tion of the law after the fact punishes behavior that one had no reason
to believe was wrong at the time.
There is an important distinction between rule-of-law formalism
and the formalism that insists on retaining a rule merely because it is
the rule.  Rule-of-law formalism allows laws to be changed pursuant to
accepted procedures, whether by legislative act or common law judi-
cial decision making.75  The argument that people must have a partic-
ular formal mechanism to assert tort claims is quite different than the
argument that the legal system should provide some formal, predict-
able means of adjudicating disputes.  While formalism promotes indi-
vidual justice and other system-related benefits, there is no need to tie
ourselves to a particular form that is no longer the optimal way to
reach our goals.  Whenever a government changes a law, expectations
of future rights must also change.  If the government changed the tort
system to mandate class actions in certain contexts, the conception of
one’s right to bring suit would change to a right to participate in a
class.  Although this change may be initially troubling, such a change
is not that different than when a legislature alters substantive rules of
conduct.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 65–66.
74. Id. at 66.
75. Admittedly, retroactive application of new common law rules is troubling in this
respect, but it is far more common for a court to apply an established law than to
adopt a new one.
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Delivering the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Lecture at Harvard
University in 1989, Justice Antonin Scalia defended formalism as a
restraint on judicial power.76  Justice Scalia provided the examples of
King Louis IX of France and King Solomon, both of whom resolved
disputes between subjects without a formal set of laws.77  They pro-
duced results that were considered fair.78  Justice Scalia
acknowledged:
The advantages of the discretion-conferring approach are obvious.  All gener-
alizations . . . are to some degree invalid, and hence every rule of law has a few
corners that do not quite fit.  It follows that perfect justice can only be
achieved if courts are unconstrained by such imperfect generalizations.79
In addition to reaching the right result—from any political stand-
point—Justice Scalia argued it is important that the law provides the
appearance of equal treatment.80  The appearance of equal treatment
confers a sense of justice over judicial decisions, which grants respect
to the legal system.81  Stated another way, in order to foster the rule
of law, people must believe that the law is just.82  This formalism dif-
fers from Professor Weinrib’s in that it does not endorse any particu-
lar mode of adjudication or substantive law, only that courts act
predictably, applying established law.83
Foreknowledge of the law is important because it creates predict-
ability.  Justice requires that people have the ability to know what the
law is before they act.84  Acknowledging that the formulation of a new
common law rule results in retroactive application of new standards,
Justice Scalia endorsed the announcement of clear rules to restrict fu-
ture judicial discretion and promote future predictability.85  When
judges adopt a rule for future decisions, they bind themselves and
lower judges in the system to follow that rule, even if their policy pref-
erences call for different results.86  Further, Justice Scalia prefers
rules to balancing tests because of the consequences of the latter on
the system of justice: “equality of treatment is difficult to demon-
strate[;] . . . predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facili-
tated; judicial courage is impaired.”87
76. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
77. Id. at 1175–76.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1177.
80. Id. at 1178.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. For comparison, see WEINRIB, supra note 8. R
84. See id. at 1179.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1177.
87. Id. at 1182.
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Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that judges in our system at times
have to enforce laws that serve larger principles in cases where more
immediate concerns would dictate the opposite result.88  The immedi-
ate concern is always more appealing in the instant case, thus under-
mining the broader, more important goals of the legal system.89
Therefore, argued Scalia, justice is served if judges, sometimes “frail
men and women, . . . can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear
principle enunciated in earlier cases.”90
When judicial decision-making is not transparent or appears to be
based on judges’ personal opinions on what is right or wrong, it may
just as easily appear that judges are making decisions to achieve de-
sired results or side with favored parties, rather than following the
law to which the parties believed they were bound.  This would be
troubling for a defendant company sitting before a pro-plaintiff judge,
an individual plaintiff sitting before a pro-business judge, or a person
of a disfavored race sitting before a racist judge.  If judges were angels,
whose only interest in the outcome were justice, allowing wide-rang-
ing judicial discretion would not be cause for alarm; but alas, judges
are mere mortals, limited by human imperfection.91  When rules are
clear ex ante and results are predictable, acceptance of the rule of law
is promoted.  If the rules do not reach the “right” results because the
rules are bad, the rules should be changed by the proper mechanisms
to reach the right results.  Abandoning the rule of law to reach the
“right” result harms the larger system, which depends on stability and
predictability.
B. Form in the Service of Function
Rule-of-law formalism allows people to know ex ante how their ac-
tions will be treated ex post.  Predictability in this sense is important
in promoting deterrence because without foreknowledge of how ac-
tions will be treated, people and firms cannot optimize their risk
profiles.92  If society decides that a certain behavior will create an obli-
gation to provide compensation for harms inflicted, rational firms will
only engage in that behavior to the extent its benefits exceed its costs,
88. See id. at 1180.
89. See id.  Consider, for example, denying “insurance” recovery to an uninsured per-
son.  Denying a claim to a person in need may make some people feel sad, but
allowing ex post insurance coverage would frustrate insurance markets and the
risk-spreading function of insurance.
90. Id. at 1180.
91. “But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human na-
ture?  If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”  THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
92. This does not require explicit declaration that certain behavior will create liabil-
ity.  Foreknowledge of a negligence standard based on cost-benefit analysis or a
strict liability regime provides sufficient predictability.
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both internal and external.  As such, the formal structure of a tort
regime can be designed to reach optimal deterrence.
From the ex ante perspective, rational individuals formulating
rules of conduct would likely design a system calculated to optimize
results for society as a whole; however, from the ex post perspective,
individuals tend to favor rules that benefit them individually, rather
than rules best for society as a whole.  An optimal system must bind
people to rules of conduct before they act or are affected by others’
actions.  In the mass tort context, people who prefer an individual
right to litigate claims due to individual justice concerns or self-inter-
est in pursuing their superior legal claims are acting in a manner ulti-
mately to the detriment of the system as a whole.
Of course, in practice some people do not favor optimal ex ante
rules because people are not always rational—indeed no one lives an
entirely rational life.  If rationality were the norm, lotteries would not
exist.  Yet, there are obvious differences between gambling and civil
litigation.  Most relevant here, occasional, modest gambling may be a
rational form of entertainment, but opting for a suboptimal tort re-
gime is not.  While many people may consider lotteries a tax on those
who are bad at math, there are likely others who regularly gamble in
moderation for entertainment.  Although most forms of gambling are
not wise economic choices—the success of skilled poker players being
an obvious exception—few indulgences are.  Luxury automobiles, five-
star restaurants, and designer clothing are not as practical as their
less expensive counterparts, but in free societies people have discre-
tion as to how they spend their money.  Indeed, if people could not
spend their money in ways that brought them pleasure, there would
be little motivation for people to produce beyond subsistence needs.
The desire for leisure and luxury drives people to work and produce,
which creates wealth.  Moreover, the industries that cater to luxury
goods and services markets further add to economic growth.  Yet, the
irrationality in each of our lives does not justify societal rules that
produce suboptimal results.
The tort system must serve different ends.  Lawsuits do not exist
for personal amusement or indulgence.  Although inefficient dispute
resolution and adjudication may generate attorney’s fees, these are
transaction costs on a system that serves larger societal goals.  Society
should not be deprived of optimal deterrence resulting from an eco-
nomically efficient system so that the state’s mechanisms can instead
be employed to serve individuals’ corrective justice desires.
The relation of form and function is important to any democratic
government.  Formality may promote stability and consent to the rule
of law, but form must be continuously evaluated and revised to serve
function.  The next Part explores John Locke’s political philosophy
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and analyzes its implications for the interaction of form and function
in government, particularly regarding American tort law.
IV. JOHN LOCKE ON FORM AND FUNCTION
A. Locke in America
The political writings of John Locke, particularly The Second Trea-
tise of Government, had tremendous influence on the political philoso-
phy of America’s Founding Fathers.93  Locke’s political philosophy
provided the intellectual justification for the American Revolution,
and his notions of individual rights, economic freedom, and property
have been largely influential in the Western world.94  Locke argued
that betrayal of trust by the government—when the government acts
to undermine the very reasons for its existence—frees the People from
their duty of obedience to the commonwealth; the People revert back
to their natural state and have the power to form a new government.95
This power of revolution is akin to a reset button always reserved by
the People when the government becomes abusive of the ends for
which it was established.96
America’s Declaration of Independence echoed Locke by pronounc-
ing “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed.”97  Further, the Declaration of
Independence justified Americans’ rebellion on “a long train of
abuses,” the same phrase Locke used to argue that revolution should
not take place for ordinary governmental malfeasance or negligence,
but only for continual, systematic abuses.98  Locke’s “trilogy of life, lib-
erty, and property” was altered by Thomas Jefferson in the Declara-
tion of Independence (“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”) to
exclude property.99  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would
later invoke the Lockean trilogy, including property.100
93. See infra, section IV.A.
94. See Paul E. Sigmund, Introduction to THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN
LOCKE xi (Paul E. Sigmund ed., Norton 2005) [hereinafter Sigmund, Introduc-
tion]. For Locke’s discussion of the dissolution of government, see JOHN LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 110–19 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., Norton 2005) (1689)
[hereinafter, LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE].
95. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 114.
96. Id.
97. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see Paul E. Sigmund,
Consent and Representation: Genuine or Fictitious?, in LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE,
supra note 94, at 343.
98. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2; see LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra
note 94, at 116.
99. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2. Paul E. Sigmund, Locke in America,
in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 94, at 110–19.
100. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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Locke’s influence on political philosophy, the American Revolution,
and America’s founding documents make his work continually rele-
vant in evaluating the nature of modern American political thought.
Locke scholar Paul Sigmund maintains, “[f]ollowing the examples of
Thomas Jefferson and the Founding Fathers, Americans have always
seen Locke as the great defender of the rights of the individual.”101
As this Article shows, the Lockean-Jeffersonean notion of individu-
alism does not call for rigid adherence to a specific system of securing
rights.  Both Locke and Jefferson shared the belief that the meaning
of a right could be changed by society.102  Although Jefferson and
Locke were in accord that “Governments long established should not
be changed for light and transient causes,” they both believed laws
should change to best serve the rights governments are established to
protect.103
B. State-of-Nature Theory
1. Why a State of Nature?104
The idea of people living in a state of nature—without any govern-
mental organization—may seem so artificial or so far removed from
modern society that it is unworthy of consideration.  Countering this
view, philosopher Robert Nozick suggested that even if state-of-nature
theory incorrectly explains how the present state of government arose,
it is useful in explaining why legal institutions, rights, and duties are
situated as they are.105  Further, imagining ourselves free from our
current model of government allows us to ask what kind of govern-
ment we would design if starting fresh today and whether institutions
currently in place still serve a useful end.
2. Lockean Hierarchy of Law
Before discussing Locke’s state of nature and the social contract,
an explanation of Locke’s underlying hierarchy of laws is needed to
understand the influences on his categorizations of law, particularly
between natural and human law.  Locke divided law, broadly con-
strued, into a four-tiered hierarchy.106  Divine or natural law is on top
101. Paul E. Sigmund, Lockean Individualism: Atomistic or Social?, in THE SELECTED
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 94, at 333.
102. Sigmund, supra note 101, at 387.
103. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (indicting King George III for interference with the legisla-
tive power of the Colonies).
104. The title for this sub-section was inspired by the opening chapter of Robert
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, entitled Why State-of-Nature Theory?.
105. See NOZICK, supra note 9, at 7–9.
106. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TRACT ON GOVERNMENT, reprinted in LOCKE: POLITICAL
ESSAYS 63 (Mark Goldie ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1662).
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of this hierarchy, followed by human (or political) law, the law of char-
ity, and finally monastic law.107
Divine law is that delivered by God.  Moving down this hierarchy,
all forms of law below divine law, including human law, “are indiffer-
ent by nature and their use is free,” meaning that matters not of God’s
concern are free to be determined by humans.108  The second tier,
human law, “is that which is enacted by anyone maintaining law and
command over others.”109  This is the tier of law in Locke’s schema
that fits our modern conception of law.  The third tier, the law of char-
ity, obligates a person to the aid of “some equal or even inferior fellow
Christian.”110  The lowest rank of law in Locke’s hierarchy is monastic
law, which consists of the dictates of one’s conscious and mind:
For it is not enough that a thing may be indifferent in its own nature unless
we are convinced that it is so. . . . Thus our liberty in indifferent things is so
insecure and so bound up with the opinion of everyone else that it may be
taken as certain that we do indeed lack the liberty which we think we lack.111
Despite his strong faith, Locke argued for broad government power
over all things indifferent to the will of God.  He would even have cast
trivial aspects of divine worship within the power of the sovereign:
“[it] follow[s] with perfect justice that indifferent things, even those
regarding divine worship, must be subjected to governmental
power.”112  Although the laws of God are superior to all other laws and
eternal in form, the laws of man must change to reflect society.  Locke
explained: “to have exactly the same constitution would not always be
an advantage to a people.”113  As such, Locke contended that God al-
lows human magistrates to rule over matters indifferent to divine
law.114  These magistrates utilize human law to dictate “which
[human behaviors], as occasion should demand, could be commanded
or prohibited, and by the wise regulation of which the welfare of the
commonwealth could be provided for.”115  While recognizing the eter-
nal and superior nature of God’s law, Locke saw that government
should alter human law to fit the needs of the time.116  The formal
107. Id.
108. Id. Indifferent things are those “which are morally neither good nor evil,” and
“all the things that are indifferent so far as a higher law is concerned are the
object and matter of a lower” law. Id. at 62, 67.
109. Id. at 63.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 65.  Using the Lockean hierarchy, an irrational obsession with individual
claim autonomy or corrective justice could be attributed to an individual’s monas-
tic law—a feeling for the way things ought to be, rather than a requirement of
legitimate government.
112. LOCKE, supra note 106, at 69.
113. Id. at 64.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
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modes prescribed and the actions proscribed by the sovereign should
change to meet the functional demands of society.  Locke explicitly re-
jected the view that formalism should be maintained for the mere sake
of formalism.117
3. What Is the State of Nature? What Is Natural Law?
The common Lockean notion of the sovereign deriving its power
from the governed through a social contract was laid out by Locke in
his Second Tract on Government (Second Tract) as one of three scena-
rios Locke believed people could use to describe the means by which a
commonwealth comes into being.118  The first school of thought is that
human beings are born slaves.119  Being slaves to the state, people
had no power to relinquish to the state, as their power already laid
with the sovereign at birth.120  The second school asserts that men are
born free, with all possessing equal power.121  A commonwealth could
not exist without a transfer of power because no government could
exist if each person remained completely free and possessed unre-
strained liberty.122  According to the second school, governments form
when people give up liberty in exchange for the order provided by a
commonwealth.123  The third school, which Locke said others had not
hypothesized, maintains that power comes from God, and through the
people, God invests power in a sovereign.124  In the Second Tract,
Locke expressed indifference as to which was the actual route by
which the sovereign attained its power.125
In Locke’s state of nature, the second of the above schools of
thought, humans exist in the absence of government—each being
their own sovereign.126  Each person is equally free to reign over her-
self and her possessions.127  No person’s rights of freedom are superior
to another’s in this regard.128  Ruth Grant described the state of na-
ture as the relationship of people who “have between them no legiti-
mate superiority or subjection, no political authority, who remain in
their natural relation as free and equal to one another.”129  Despite
117. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 57–58, 86.
118. See LOCKE, supra note 106, at 69–71.
119. See id. at 69–70.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 70.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 69–71.
126. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 18.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Ruth Grant, Locke’s Political Anthropology and Lockean Individualism, 50 J.
POL. 42 (1988), reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE,
supra note 94, at 339–40.
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the lack of legitimate political authority to bind one’s actions, Locke’s
state of nature is governed by a natural law that makes it wrong for a
person to destroy herself or her possessions or do harm to another’s
life or property, except for in cases of self-defense or punishment.130
There exists a distinct right “of taking reparation, which belongs only
to the injured party.”131  When seeking reparation, others who find it
just may aid the injured party in recovering from the injuring
party.132  Locke maintained “[t]hat he who has suffered the damage
has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the
damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods
or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation.”133
Despite natural law’s right of restitution for transgressions, the
remedy is not ideal because, each man being his own sovereign, no one
source of power is superior to any other.134  Natural law’s dictates of
good moral behavior are ineffective at providing security because some
people are either ignorant of these laws or choose to violate them for
personal gain.  Without a commonwealth and human law, individuals
would have trouble vindicating their rights against those with more
strength, resources, or allies.  Further, without a concept of finality to
disputes, the parties may continue fighting indefinitely to redress a
wrong much smaller than the damage done trying to rectify it.135
130. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 19.
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 19–20.
135. See NOZICK, supra note 9, at 10–12.  Locke’s notion of natural law is similar to the
modern concept of “human rights” in that neither of these sources of “law” are
actually the law of any state; rather, they represent notions of morality that their
professors believe states should aspire to promote and enforce. See generally Jo-
seph M. de Torre, Human Rights, Natural Law, and Thomas Aquinas, VI CATHO-
LIC SOC. SCI. REV. 187, 200–02 (2001) (discussing historical attempts to study
human rights in the context of natural law, incorporate human rights into sub-
stantive law, and frame human rights as the aspiration of substantive law).  In
this vein, human rights are a modern form of natural law, their basis being the
proposition that human beings (should) have certain inalienable rights.  The defi-
ciency in both natural law and human rights is that without state recognition or
enforcement as a corollary to the enforcement of some other right—a state that
criminalizes murder would also defend the human right to be free from murder—
these are not cognizable as we think of rights in positive law systems. See gener-
ally id.  Amorphous ideas of human rights are best understood as aspirational
goals or common ideals on the proper treatment and dignity of human beings.
See generally id.  This appears to be the practical thrust of Locke’s natural law
and his justification for the commonwealth.
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4. Why Choose a Commonwealth?
I no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a
storm, which hath lasted almost hitherto . . . .
—John Locke136
[G]eneral freedom is but a general bondage . . . .
—John Locke137
The chaos inherent in the state of nature drives people to give up
their freedom for majority rule by a community in order to protect
their persons and their property.138  While the state of nature pro-
vides the greatest freedom, people choose to give up this freedom be-
cause “the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to
the invasion of others.”139  In the state of nature there is not “an es-
tablished, settled, known law, received and allowed by common con-
sent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure
to decide all controversies between them.”140
In abandoning the state of nature for the protections of the com-
monwealth, Locke believed people would choose a government that
maintained optimal freedom.141  Locke’s ideal of optimal freedom
under government requires governmental protection from others
through legislatively enacted law and rule-of-law formalism, which al-
lows people to act with foreknowledge of the standards to which they
will be held:
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by,
common to everyone of that society, and made by the legislative power erected
in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes
not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary
will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but
the law of nature.142
Rational citizens desire formally declared laws under which to live.
Without formalism, the law may be arbitrarily enforced in a way that
does not protect life and property.143  For the same reasons, formalism
is desirable in setting the rules of engagement for legislative action
and constraining judicial decision making.144  It enhances one’s free-
dom to know ex ante the rules under which she will be governed.  In
136. John Locke, FIRST TRACT ON GOVERNMENT, reprinted in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS,
supra note 106, at 7.
137. Id.
138. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 58–59.
139. Id. at 72.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 27.
143. See id. at 77.
144. For a discussion of the importance of rule-of-law formalism to foster predictabil-
ity and restrain arbitrary governmental power, see supra section III.A.
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Locke’s time, there was great fear that the sovereign would abuse the
criminal law, particularly to prosecute people for their religious or po-
litical beliefs—a fear that spurred early Americans to adopt certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights.145  Equal application of law to all, in-
cluding the lawmaker, promotes a system of law that benefits society
as a whole.  Without formal equality in the application of laws, one
who is out of favor with the sovereign may be arbitrarily punished.146
Rule of law requires predictable, uniform application of a set of formal
laws.147  People, regardless of social standing, should be able to struc-
ture their actions to avoid running afoul of the law.148  In modern
times, rule-of-law formalism is desirable because, among other rea-
sons, it can prevent arbitrary execution of the law based upon a per-
son’s race or social status.
5. Locke’s Notion of Property
Locke’s theory of property rights is consistent with reform of mass
tort litigation rules.  Locke’s conception of property begins with the
notion that each person has a right of property in her person.149  One’s
labor is also her own, and by fusing her labor with objects of nature,
she gains rights over those objects.150  This justifies excluding others
from claiming property rights in those objects, so long as there is
enough left of common rights for others.151  Locke denied the sover-
eign the power to arbitrarily take property from individuals for its
own benefit, but allowed that the sovereign “may have power to make
laws for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst
145. Consider that Locke went into exile from 1683–1689 because of his political activ-
ities and published the Two Treatises of Government anonymously, in part due to
fear that the Second Treatise’s justification of armed revolution could have sub-
jected him to imprisonment or execution. See Sigmund, Introduction, supra note
94, at xviii–xix. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S.
1776) (listing grievances against King George III, including subjecting colonists
to foreign jurisdictions, deprivation of trial by jury, controlling tenure and pay of
judges, and trying colonists “for pretended offences”), with U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1 (protecting the tenure and pay of judges), art. III, § 3 (defining the crime of
treason and requirements for prosecution), amend. I (prohibiting Congress from
establishing religion and protecting “the free exercise thereof”), amend. VI (secur-
ing rights of criminal defendants “to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation”).
146. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 27.
147. Id.
148. See Resnick, supra note 41, at 112–13 (citing SECOND TREATISE, supra note 87, at
§ 142).
149. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 28–29.
150. Id.
151. See id.
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another.”152  Although the government may only take property by con-
sent, taxation is legitimate if consented to either directly by the indi-
vidual or indirectly through elected representatives.153  Under this
formulation of property rights, Locke would likely view any legislative
reformulation of the tort system to further the common good as within
the commonwealth’s power of property regulation.
Scholars have hotly debated the implications of Lockean property
rights on modern governments.  John Simmons reads Locke as advo-
cating a minimalist state designed to protect individual rights, partic-
ularly “their ‘lives, liberties, and fortunes.’”154  Meanwhile, James
Tully reads Locke in a more communitarian light and argues that
Locke’s conception of property requires people to submit themselves to
the commonwealth and relinquish their property rights along with
their power.155  Under Tully’s view, property from the state of the na-
ture is redefined by the community, making it community property.156
Jeremy Waldron counters Tully’s assessment of Locke’s treatment
of governmental claims on property by arguing Locke distinguished
between the regulation and confiscation of property.157  This view al-
lows the government to affect property rights through the exercise of
governmental power but not to confiscate and redistribute prop-
erty.158  This view is, of course, question begging, as at a certain point
it becomes difficult to meaningfully distinguish between taking and
regulation.  Waldron’s ultimate assessment is that government may
regulate personal actions and property use through legitimate laws;
legitimacy being predicated upon some form of consent.159  Of course,
Locke allowed for consent through legislative action, which renders
the condition of consent a nullity, so long as the appropriate processes
and procedures are followed.160  If Locke allowed consent to effect a
valid taking, and consent can be given by the government on behalf of
the people, it is hard to imagine when a taking would lack consent.161
152. Id. at 79; see id. at 78–79.
153. See id.
154. A. John Simmons, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS
OF SOCIETY (Princeton Univ. Press 1993), reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 94, at 344–45.
155. James Tully, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1980), reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS
OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 94, at 325, 328–29 (quoting LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE,
supra note 94, § 137).
156. Id.
157. See Jeremy Waldron, Locke, Tully and the Regulation of Property, 32 POL. STUD.
98 (1984), reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra
note 94, at 330–32.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Perhaps Waldron’s larger point is that the commonwealth was
formed to preserve people’s claims to property in the state of nature.
Although entering the commonwealth necessarily affects those rights
in small degrees, people did not leave the state of nature so the com-
monwealth could redistribute property amongst the people.162  That
is, Locke saw government regulation of property as a parallel to gov-
ernment regulation of the individual—the government could exercise
power over the individual, but only to the extent doing so would in-
crease the individual’s well-being.163  Ultimately, any distinction be-
tween regulation and confiscation is a matter of degree rather than
form.164
Waldron’s critique of Tully turns on Locke’s notion of majority con-
sent.165  If each individual were free to reject any law he chose, no
person would consent to a law he believed caused more harm than
good.166  Individuals would enter the commonwealth only to the ex-
tent they predicted a net gain.167  Commonwealths do not, however,
allow individuals to opt in and out on a piecemeal basis.  In a common-
wealth, people are bound by the rule of the majority, subject to any
institutionalized individual protections built into the constitution.
Those with greater property holdings may be subjected to laws that
regulate or redistribute property at a level above their preferences.
Due to the lack of protection in the state of nature, people neverthe-
less choose to give up their complete freedom and subject themselves
to majority rule.  For, in a complete state of anarchy—more consistent
with Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature than Locke’s—property rights
would be nearly worthless.168
Once part of the commonwealth, all are equally subject to majority
rule.  Majority rule, then, allows the commonwealth to subject prop-
erty to levels of regulation greater than would be desired by those who
favor protection of individual rights over wealth redistribution.  Al-
though Locke’s political views are consistent with a limited state that
protects individual property rights and allows individuals to accumu-
162. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 77 (arguing that man would not
leave the state of nature to subject himself to completely arbitrary power, as this
would be worse than the state of nature and something no rational being would
accept).
163. Id.
164. See Waldron, supra note 157, at 330–32 (citing LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra
note 94, at 78–79).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann
eds., Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum 2003) (1651); Paul E. Sigmund, Locke as
Hobbesian Hedonist, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE,
supra note 94, at 273 (rejecting Leo Strauss’s contentions that Locke was a modi-
fied Hobbes and that Locke viewed “the state of nature as a state of war”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB403.txt unknown Seq: 27 15-MAY-12 13:59
2012] OF FORM AND FUNCTION 913
late wealth,169 his conceptualization of the state of nature and the na-
ture of government does not compel the classical liberal model of ideal
government.  Tully and Waldron clash over Locke’s notion of property;
but ultimately, any firm distinction between regulation and redistri-
bution is hollow.  Tully and Waldron’s true conflict is whether Locke
viewed property more consistently with the classical liberal model of a
state that protects individual rights or the socialist model that redis-
tributes wealth.170
6. The Social Contract: Bound by the Will of the Majority
Upon entering a commonwealth, the social contract binds people to
the will of the majority.  Majority rule is necessary because if individu-
als were to retain the right to break free of the commonwealth, the
social contract would be meaningless and the state of nature would
endure.171  Unanimous consent is impossible to attain in virtually all
matters, and requiring universal agreement on matters of any impor-
tance would cripple the commonwealth.172  The commonwealth’s sur-
vival requires majority rule in some form.
The concept of majority rule is applicable to the mass tort context.
As a member of a commonwealth, an individual necessarily gives up
certain freedoms so that the commonwealth can serve societal inter-
ests.  If one of those interests is effective mass tort resolution, forfeit-
ing the right of individual claim autonomy may be necessary.  In the
class action context, opt-out rights undermine the ability of the class
to litigate as a whole, thus crippling the class.  For plaintiff classes to
function effectively, all members must be bound by majority will.  As
with forming the commonwealth, this requires individuals to give up a
certain form of autonomy ex ante to assure the best anticipated re-
sults for all ex post, thus benefitting each individual’s prospective
situation.
C. Lockean Rationality: Form in the Service of Function
Although Locke considered God’s natural law permanent, he
strongly advocated that human law be a product of rational inquiry,
changing over time to meet the needs of society.173  This preference for
169. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 30 (noting that man has a right to
“[a]s much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so
much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more
than his share, and belongs to others”).
170. Both of which differ from the economic ideal of a state that sets rules to promote
economic efficiency.
171. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 59.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 57–58.
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rationality and progress is evident from Locke’s justification for re-
placing a monarchy with a representative government:
[W]hen time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacred-
ness to customs, which the negligent and unforeseeing innocence of the first
ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp; the people finding
their properties not secure under the government as then it was (whereas gov-
ernment has no other end but the preservation of property), could never be
safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was
placed in collective bodies of men . . . .174
According to this philosophy, a representative legislature, as a supe-
rior form of government, is the proper successor to a monarchy.175
Over time, customs develop reverence in spite of their defects
merely because of their age, but people are wise to enact reform to
improve government and meet modern needs.176  Monarchy was an
improvement over anarchy, tribalism, and feudalism that served a
purpose until a sufficient number of people became sufficiently edu-
cated to demand the ruling class be expanded.  Locke argued that rep-
resentative government is preferable to monarchy because greater
freedom is attained when no person is superior to the law.177  When
members of the legislature are bound to the law, the legislature will
make laws to which they want others bound and to which they are
willing to be bound themselves.178  Despite the sentimentality a cer-
tain practice or mode of governance gains over time, its durability
should be based on utility, not age.  Although the common law tort
system is certainly preferable to individuals lawlessly vindicating
rights without the civility, force, and restraint of law, the system is
imperfect.  As customs should give way when no longer productive, a
more efficient and effective mass tort adjudication mechanism is pref-
erable to the common law system.
Under Locke’s functional view, government’s underlying purpose is
to serve the human condition.  Writing on the nature and function of
law, Locke posited, “[a] civil law is nothing but the agreement of a
society of men either by themselves, or one or more authorised by
them, determining the rights, and appointing rewards and punish-
ments to certain actions of all within that society.”179  It is within the
realm of civil law to regulate and preserve property, and all such
power should only be used for public good.180  Speaking to the purpose
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See generally Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Ad-
missible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 229 (1922) (noting “[t]he marvelous
capacity of a Latin phrase to serve as a substitute for reasoning”).
177. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 58.
178. Id.
179. John Locke, Law, reprinted in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 106, at
269–70.
180. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 18.
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of the commonwealth, Locke wrote, “[t]he end of civil society is civil
peace and prosperity, or the preservation of the society and every
member thereof in a free and peaceable enjoyment of all the good
things of this life that belong to each of them . . . .”181  Therefore, in
developing laws a state should remain mindful that its purpose is to
meet this underlying goal, and not merely to preserve dogma.
Locke recognized, however, that people are often not governed by
reason: “[t]he three great things that govern mankind are reason, pas-
sion, and superstition.  The first governs a few, the two last share the
bulk of mankind, and possess them in their turns; but superstition
most powerfully and produces the greatest mischiefs.”182  People com-
monly favor a certain rule because they feel a principle is right or
wrong, but it is far easier to feel something is right or wrong than to
articulate why something feels right or wrong.  On some level, demo-
cratically developed law implies that governing rules will reach re-
sults that feel right, but it is important that the rules feel right for the
right reasons.  Regardless of how a law came to be, with time people
lose sight of the law’s purpose and come to see the law as justifying its
own existence.183  Over time, even a well-reasoned law that reaches a
good result may become ineffective.
Locke advocated reforming customs to match modern realities.  In
the context of aligning legislative representation with current popula-
tion distribution, he explained: “[t]hings of this world are in so con-
stant a flux, that nothing remains long in the same state.”184
Customs often remain in place after “the reasons of them are ceased,”
thus producing “gross absurdities.”185  Barriers to beneficial social re-
forms include superstition, ignorance, intellectual laziness, partisan-
ship, and self-interest; but Locke pressed that human reason and
intelligence allow for progress if the goals of social institutions can
first be identified, which will allow the institutions’ procedural and
substantive rules to be reformulated to better meet the institutions’
181. John Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, reprinted in LOCKE: POLITICAL ES-
SAYS, supra note 106, at 216.
182. John Locke, Reason, Passion, Superstition, reprinted in LOCKE: POLITICAL ES-
SAYS, supra note 106, at 280; see also Grant, supra note 129, at 341 (“[Locke ar-
gued that] men are not rational maximizers of utility; Locke does not describe
men according to the model economic man of contemporary theory.  By and large,
their conduct in life is not governed by the independent calculation of how best to
satisfy their individual interests.  On the contrary, their conduct is most likely to
be governed by common opinions and beliefs as to what constitutes a happy and
respectable life.  And men are often led to quite unreasonable things on the basis
of these powerful social norms.”).
183. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 86.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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goals.186  After determining the function of a social institution, one
can analyze its efficacy at serving that function and whether the func-
tion is still needed by society.  This analysis rejects ontological argu-
ments on the nature of law grounded only in tradition or custom.
Critical evaluation of social institutions forces a clear understanding
of their goals, the rationality of those goals, and the efficacy of the
means used to achieve those goals.  When a goal is suboptimally
served by the current mechanism purported to achieve it, rationality
demands reforming the mechanism, regardless of illogical appeals
grounded only on tradition or custom.187
Locke’s system of rationally examining institutions and reforming
them to better meet their goals is illustrated by his views on the rela-
tionship of husband and wife.188  Locke argued that marriage should
not be governed by the absolute power of man over woman because
this would cause women to avoid marriage.189  He argues that, “the
ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condi-
tion of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary
to that state.”190  Rather, matters of a marriage not essential to the
state should be governed by the couple through mutual agreement.191
Applying the same rationality to the governance of a marriage as he
applies to governance of a state, Locke propounded, “[c]onjugal society
could subsist and attain its ends without [absolute power of husbands]
. . . nothing being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the
ends for which it is made.”192  Locke’s rationality requires that rules
exist only to serve a valid function; without a valid function, no rule is
necessary or proper.
D. Lockean Implications for Tort Law
Locke’s formulation of natural law is not an obstacle to social
change.  He saw that societies changed and that law was a vehicle to
foster and promote positive change in human associations.193  David
186. See Resnick, supra note 41, at 82 (“Locke’s great contribution to modern liberal
thought arose from his commitment to a critical rationalism that undermined the
foundations of traditional society and thoroughly rejected traditional modes of
thought grounded in irrational appeals to custom and historical precedent.  Locke
was aware of social change and the need to defend new and more rational ap-
proaches to solving the problems of social order created by a society in transi-
tion. . . .  He believed that human reason could delineate the rational purposes of
human institutions and could discover appropriate rational methods for achiev-
ing them.”).
187. See id. at 89–90.
188. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 52.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See Resnick, supra note 41, at 85.
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Resnick reads Locke to say, “[n]ot only must we realize that as a prac-
tical matter different times call for different social arrangements, but
we must also be skeptical of those who deny the facts of social change
and attempt to preserve outmoded institutions that no longer function
as they once did.”194
Locke’s notion of property regulation imposes a duty on govern-
ment to set property rights in a manner that prevents the hindrance
of labor.195  It naturally follows that vindication of rights arising from
injury to person or property—both of which Locke refers to “by the
general name property”—should be accomplished by the means that
best promote efficiency.196  In order to balance interests in the preser-
vation of property and person with interests in economic efficiency,
the tort system should take the form that achieves optimal deterrence.
Optimal deterrence is in everybody’s best interest ex ante because
preventing unreasonable risk—risk that by definition creates more
harm than good—promotes economic efficiency, which is in everyone’s
best interest when no one knows who will bear the harms that materi-
alize from risk.197
Locke supported formal restraints typical of the traditional tort
system, finding great weakness in the state of nature because every
individual has executive power to enforce his own rights:
[I]t is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will
make men partial to themselves and their friends: and, on the other side, that
ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others;
and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow: and that therefore
God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and vio-
lence of men.198
Although civil litigation provides a civilized means for fulfilling the
end of corrective justice, individual tort claim autonomy frustrates
class actions in a manner similar to the chaos Locke saw resulting
from an absence of civil remedies to disputes.  Namely, a person
driven by self-interest or motivated by revenge may act in a way that
frustrates the class’s suit and undermines the achievement of optimal
deterrence.  In the class action context, opt-outs may benefit defend-
ants by splintering the class and allowing asymmetries of scale to
overpower plaintiffs’ claims.199
In Locke’s time, the traditional tort system was seen as an ade-
quate, peaceful means of addressing small-scale torts.  John Goldberg
194. Id. at 115.
195. Mark Goldie, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE: TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Mark Goldie ed., Everyman 1993), reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 94, at 357, 359.
196. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 72.
197. See Rosenberg, Decoupling, supra note 29, at 1880, 1891.
198. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 22.
199. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
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explains Blackstone’s vision of tort law as an outgrowth of the social
contract.  To Blackstone, tort:
[P]rovided the means by which individuals could vindicate their rights against
wrongful invasions by others.  Just as the structure of English government—
King, Parliament, and common law—helped protect rights against official tyr-
anny, so tort defined and defended the right not to be battered, detained, de-
famed, dispossessed or otherwise injured by others.  Tort therefore helped
fulfill the social contract.  Upon entering civilized society, individuals give up
their natural right to wreak vengeance on their wrongdoers in exchange for
the positive legal power to invoke the apparatus of the state to obtain legal
redress from them.200
In this view, surely the traditional tort system is preferable to law-
lessly wreaking vengeance—in the mass tort context this would pre-
sumably take the form of assaulting corporate officers, managers, and
researchers.
The modern problem is that traditional civil suits are not an effec-
tive means to address alleged mass torts.  Although a champion of in-
dividual rights, Locke’s theory of commonwealth-vindication of rights
exemplifies a notion of collective justice.  His commitment to individ-
ual rights does not preclude viewing tort law as more than a mecha-
nism for an abstract moral notion of corrective justice.  Locke reasoned
that the commonwealth’s civil justice system was designed to serve
the same ends sought through the natural law right to punish trans-
gressions—the vindication of wrongs (which acted as a form of victim
compensation due to its reparation component) and the deterrence of
future wrongdoing.201
Mandatory class action is justified on the same grounds Locke used
to argue for majority rule in government.  Allowing individuals to opt
out of laws they do not agree with “would make the mighty leviathan
of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast
the day it was born in, . . . for where the majority cannot conclude the
rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be im-
mediately dissolved again.”202  When man enters civil society, he re-
linquishes “his power to punish offences against the law of nature, in
prosecution of his own private judgment.”203  The commonwealth pun-
ishes transgressions “for the preservation of the property of all the
members of that society, as far as is possible.”204  And when a civil
society decides upon a means for addressing tort adjudication, all
members are likewise bound.  If the preservation of property is not
best served by the traditional tort suit, there is no reason to rely on
200. Goldberg, supra note 13, at 1504–05 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 55–56, 120–37 (facsimile ed. 1979) (1765–69)).
201. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 21–22.
202. Id. at 60.
203. Id. at 54.
204. Id.
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this suboptimal system merely because it is custom.205  If an alterna-
tive tort system proves more effective and efficient, classical notions of
justice—the underpinnings of American political philosophy—are not
a barrier to its adaptation, but rather support reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Although people entering a commonwealth give up the freedom in-
herent in the state of nature, they do so for better protection of life,
freedom, and property.206  Similarly, people through their government
may agree ex ante to give up the right to individually pursue mass tort
claims in order to optimally deter tortious injuries and provide opti-
mal compensation for harm.  By voluntarily giving up certain free-
doms and binding oneself with others, an individual can increase her
well-being.  Perhaps because American culture greatly values free-
dom, we are reluctant to give up any autonomy.  But our freedom is
beneficial because it allows us to make choices, and those choices al-
low us to order our lives in ways that increase our fulfillment.207  By
binding ourselves to choices, however, we necessarily give up the free-
dom to have chosen differently.  The freedom to bind ourselves—to
give up a part of our freedom—makes our freedom worth having.
205. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting that customs often remain in
place after “the reasons of them are ceased,” thus producing “gross absurdities”).
206. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 94, at 73.
207. See supra note 53 (providing Nozick’s justification for the importance of individ-
ual autonomy).
